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Supervisor:  Timothy Z. Keith 
 
Abstract: The purpose of this study is to determine whether Spearman’s Law of 
Diminishing Returns (SLODR) operates differentially by race and by sex. In its simplest 
terms, SLODR is the assertion that a general intelligence factor (g) is a less meaningful 
determinant of cognitive ability at higher levels of ability. Using the standardization data 
from the Differential Ability Scales, Second Edition (DAS-II), separate multigroup bifactor 
models (by race and by sex) will be created in which loadings and squared loadings 
from g to subtests will be estimated.  
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Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to determine whether Spearman’s Law of Diminishing 
Returns (SLODR) operates differentially by race/ethnicity or by sex. In its simplest terms, 
SLODR is the notion that at higher levels of ability, a general intelligence factor (g) is a less 
meaningful determinant of cognitive ability than at lower levels of ability (Detterman & Daniel, 
1989; Spearman, 1927). 
Test scores on measures of cognitive ability are positively correlated; a general 
intelligence factor (g) is commonly cited as the primary reason for these correlations. This g 
factor is therefore useful in explaining individual differences in cognitive ability test 
performance (Bartholomew, 2004; Jensen, 1998). A key assumption of g is that it operates in a 
constant manner across individuals (Wolfle, 1940). Spearman (1927), however, found that the 
influence of g is differentiated by cognitive ability: children of lower ability had higher 
intercorrelations between mental ability tasks than did children of average ability. This 
phenomenon has been found in other samples and has become known as Spearman’s Law of 
Diminishing Returns. If SLODR is indeed accurate, it would call into question the usefulness of 
a single factor analytic model to represent those of low and high ability (Detterman & Daniel, 
1989). 
The study of intelligence as a construct has been controversial from the beginning. 
Concerns of cultural bias in test measures have existed since the introduction of the first measure 
of intelligence, the Binet-Simon Scales (Binet & Simon, 1917; Burt, 1921; Stern, 1914). Because 
these measures were not often created with an eye towards cultural fairness, they often were 
subject to several criticisms, including a lack of inclusion of minority members in 
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standardization samples (Jensen, 1980; C. R. Reynolds & Lowe, 2009; Valencia & Suzuki, 
2001).  
Evidence suggests that modern intelligence tests lack cultural bias on the basis of race 
(Valencia & Suzuki, 2001). Furthermore, there is evidence to support equivalent factor structures 
across racial groups on well-known measures like the Woodcock Johnson Cognitive battery, the 
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children—Fifth Edition, and the Differential Ability Scales, 
Second Edition (Edwards & Oakland, 2006; Scheiber, 2016; Trundt, Keith, Caemmerer, & 
Smith, 2017).  
Although no sex differences likely exist for full scale IQ, there are notable differences in 
certain tasks (Halpern & LaMay, 2000). For example, males demonstrate a consistent advantage 
on tasks of visual-spatial ability (Voyer, Voyer, & Bryden, 1995). Meanwhile, females tend to 
perform higher on tasks related to long-term memory and processing speed (e.g., Geffen, Moar, 
O’Hanlon, Clark, & Geffen, 1990; Stumpf & Jackson, 1994). Another curious phenomenon is 
that the tails of the IQ distribution tend to be more male-heavy; that is, males are overrepresented 
in the highest percentiles of overall intelligence and at the lowest (DeFries & Gillis, 1993; 
Halpern, 2012; Johnson, Carothers, & Deary, 2008). Males are more likely to be diagnosed with 
learning disabilities, intellectual disabilities, and language disorders (Halpern, 2012; Henning-
Stout & Close-Conoley, 1992).  
The issues of test bias and fairness remain relevant, especially as new intelligence 
measures and revisions are developed. These issues are more pressing considering the use of 
intelligence testing to make determinations of special education eligibility and gifted program 
placement (Holdnack & Weiss, 2006; Kaufman & Harrison, 1986). The presence of SLODR 
indicates that the current theoretical model of intelligence may not be the most practically useful. 
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For example, SLODR may help to explain why overall g is an inherently limited way of 
assessing people of above-average ability and making determinations about giftedness curricula 
(Deary et al., 1996).  
Because intelligence testing is so crucially important, and because the implications of 
SLODR are so compelling, it therefore follows that SLODR be understood as fully and 
completely as possible. Despite the amount of research into SLODR, racial differences, and sex 
differences, no study has attempted to understand the interrelationship of these topics.  
The aim of this study is to answer the following question: Does Spearman’s Law of 
Diminishing Returns (SLODR) operate differentially by race/ethnicity or by sex? This aim will 
be accomplished using standardization data from the Differential Ability Scales, Second Edition 
(DAS-II). Separate multigroup higher-order models (by race/ethnicity and by sex) will be created 
in which a nonlinear interaction term (g x g) will be included. These models will be compared 
using qualitative methods, as traditional fit indices (such as χ² or CFI) are not calculated for 
nonlinear models.  
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Integrative Analysis and Interpretation 
This integrative analysis will begin by explaining Spearman’s original hypotheses about 
the nature of intelligence, including the presence of a single, general intelligence factor. This 
presentation will be followed by a description of current intelligence theory with special 
emphasis on Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) theory. Then, Spearman’s Law of Diminishing Returns 
(SLODR) and recent research about this phenomenon will be explained. Specific methodological 
considerations will be discussed as they relate to the current investigation. Last, a discussion of 
race/ethnicity and sex differences in intelligence will place the current investigation of SLODR 
in context of these previous research inquiries.  
A general intelligence factor  
 Spearman’s (1927) theory of general intelligence posited that there is a single general 
factor of intelligence underlying all aspects of cognitive ability. He described this general factor, 
or g, as “something analogous to an ‘energy’,” a force that could be expended to complete 
various cognitive tasks. He noted that tasks designed to measure different aspects of intelligence 
(e.g., reasoning, memory, abstract thought) were highly correlated with one another, evidence of 
the universality of g. Spearman regarded g as the most important aspect of his research, as it was 
such a strong and consistent indicator of mental performance. This consistency is illuminated in 
his theorem of indifference of the indicator, which states that “for the purpose of indicating the 
amount of g possessed by a person, any test will do just as well as any other, provided only that 
its correlation with g is equally high.” This theorem is still used to explain high correlations 
among intelligence tests (Jensen, 1992). 
Spearman (1927) also proposed specific factors, or s, that were subsumed by g. In his 
words, g is the “amount of a general mental energy,” while s is “the efficiency of specific mental 
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engines.” Other researchers became interested in these specific factors after Spearman published 
his 1927 work (Holzinger & Harman, 1938; Kelley, 1928; Thurstone, 1938), though some 
researchers regarded g as a lower-order factor in their models (Burt, 1949) or did not consider 
overall g at all (Guilford, 1959).  
First conceptualized in the 1940s and fully developed in the 1960s, Cattell and Horn’s 
theory of fluid and crystallized intelligence (Gf-Gc theory) outlined multiple broad factors of 
intelligence. In its first rendition, five broad factors were hypothesized, including a personality 
factor (Horn & Cattell, 1966). Horn & Cattell has revised this theory a number of times, 
eventually dropping the personality factor, and settling on eight broad factors of intelligence: 
fluid reasoning (Gf); comprehensive knowledge (Gc); visual processing (Gv); auditory 
processing (Ga); processing speed (Gs); short-term memory (Gsm); long-term retrieval (Glr); 
and quantitative ability (Gq). The two main features of the theory, Gf and Gc, represent abilities 
gained primarily from genetic factors and from educational or cultural opportunities, respectively 
(Horn, 1991).  
As factor analytic studies continued to show that the broad abilities described in Gf-Gc 
theory loaded heavily onto a second-order g factor, a theory that combined the g model and the 
Gf-Gc model was introduced (Carroll, 1992, 1993). This theory is represented by a three-stratum 
factor structure with a general intelligence factor, g, at the top, several broad abilities at the 
second stratum, and many specific abilities at the first stratum. The broad abilities are largely the 
same as those listed in Gf-Gc theory, though Gq is now generally regarded as an achievement 
factor as opposed to a cognitive factor. Carroll, after having reanalyzed over 460 factor analytic 
studies on the nature of intelligence, stated that this model, now called the Cattell-Horn-Carroll 
theory of intelligence, was the best at describing human cognitive ability. A list of the seven 
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most researched broad abilities, along with their descriptions, can be found in Table 1; this list is 
adapted from Schneider and McGrew (2012).  
Table 1 
CHC Broad Abilities and Descriptions 
Broad Ability Description 
Fluid Reasoning (Gf) The deliberate but flexible control of attention to solve novel, on-the-
spot problems that cannot be performed by relying exclusively on 
previously learned habits, schemas, and scripts 
Crystallized 
Intelligence (Gc) 
The depth and breadth of knowledge and skills that are valued by 
one’s culture 
Visual Processing 
(Gv) 
The ability to make use of simulated mental imagery (often in 
conjunction with currently perceived images) to solve problems 
Auditory Processing 
(Ga) 
The ability to detect and process meaningful nonverbal information in 
sound 
Short-Term Memory 
(Gsm) 
The ability to encode, maintain, and manipulate information in one’s 
immediate awareness 
Long-Term Storage 
and Retrieval (Glr) 
The ability to store, consolidate, and retrieve information over periods 
of time measured in minutes, hours, days, and years 
Processing Speed 
(Gs) 
The ability to perform simple, repetitive cognitive tasks quickly and 
fluently  
 
Note: Adapted from “The Cattell-Horn-Carroll model of intelligence”, by W.J. Schneider & K.S. 
McGrew in Contemporary intellectual assessment: Theories, tests, and issues, 2012, New York: 
Guilford Press (pp. 99-112). 
 
Explaining Spearman’s Law of Diminishing Returns 
 Spearman (1927), as noted above, regarded g as a sort of mental “energy.” Following this 
same analogy, he proposed a law of diminishing returns for g that operates in the same way as in 
engine mechanics. He posited that the more “energy” a person has available (that is, the more 
overall intelligence), the less advantage is added with constant, increased amounts. This concept 
was illustrated by a correlation matrix of 12 cognitive ability tasks for what he called “normal” 
and “mentally defective” children, with the “normal” group showing a smaller average 
intercorrelation among the tests. The mean correlation among the tasks for the “normal” children 
(n = 78) was .466, while for the “defective” children (n = 22) it was .782.  
  7 
 Detterman and Daniel (1989) seemingly rediscovered this phenomenon when analyzing 
subtests on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale—Revised (WAIS-R) and the Wechsler 
Intelligence Scale for Children—Revised (WISC-R). They found that subtest intercorrelations 
were similarly related to ability group; the intercorrelations were highest in the low ability group, 
and “declined systematically with increasing IQ.” For both tests, the intercorrelations were twice 
as high in the low IQ groups than in the high IQ groups. This publication, however, was 
apparently unaware of this rediscovery, claiming that Spearman’s (1904) emphasis on “positive 
manifold” implied that the positive manifold was “uniformly distributed over the full range of 
ability” (Detterman & Daniel, 1989). Here, positive manifold refers to how tests of cognitive 
ability are all positively correlated with one another. It was Deary and Pagliani (1991) who 
pointed out that indeed Spearman had hypothesized the very thing that Detterman and Daniel 
(1989) had discovered.  
 Nevertheless, Detterman and Daniel (1989) understood the importance of such a finding, 
stating that “if the finding that correlations between mental tests vary systematically by level of 
ability is found to be a general one, not specific to certain tests, then the implications of this 
finding are substantial.” Many researchers have replicated these findings using this methodology 
(or one very similar) on different test batteries since this study (e.g., Deary et al., 1996; Deary & 
Pagliari, 1991; Evans, 1999; Legree, Pifer, & Grafton, 1996; Lynn, 1992; Lynn & Cooper, 1993; 
Maxwell, 1972).  
 Anderson’s (1992) theory of minimal cognitive architecture has become a useful and 
common way for researchers to conceptualize the mechanism by which such a phenomenon is 
possible. This theory states that a single general processing mechanism constrains the 
effectiveness of various, more specific domains of cognitive performance. This helps explain 
  8 
why different cognitive domains are correlated (i.e., positive manifold). For those for whom the 
general processing mechanism is faster or more efficient, the specific mechanisms are less 
constrained, meaning that these specific abilities are less correlated with one another.  
 This theory is not necessarily antithetical to the hypotheses of Spearman (1927), who 
likened g to fuel for engines to complete domain-specific functions, but that provides 
diminishing returns in increased engine efficiency as incremental increases are made. Detterman 
and Daniel (1989) also claimed that if “central processes are deficient, they limit the efficiency 
of all other processes in the system. So all processes in subjects with deficits tend to operate at 
the same uniform level. However, subjects without deficits show much more variability across 
processes because they do not have deficits in important central processes” (p. 358).
 Thurstone’s (1938) sampling theory, another common way for researchers to frame this 
phenomenon, posits that low ability individuals have fewer cognitive resources on which to base 
their behaviors, and that high ability individuals have more cognitive resources, such that 
complex behaviors can only be expressed by those with the capacity to do so (i.e., higher ability 
individuals). This theory, too, is compatible with the ideas of Spearman (1927) and Detterman 
and Daniel (1989), as it suggests that, at lower ability levels, fewer cognitive resources may 
constrain a wide range of different behaviors.  
Methodological considerations when studying SLODR 
 Traditionally, SLODR has been measured by dividing samples into high and low ability 
groups and either comparing the intercorrelations of different tasks or the proportion of variance 
accounted for by a common (g) factor (Tucker-Drob, 2009). In the classic Detterman and Daniel 
(1989) study, intercorrelations were compared between intellectually disabled individuals and 
their same-age college-going peers, as well as low and high IQ high school students, on the 
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WAIS-R. The intellectually disabled and low IQ groups had substantially higher intercorrelations 
than the college and high IQ groups. Detterman and Daniel (1989) also divided the 
standardization sample from the WAIS-R and WISC-R into five ability groups; these ability 
groups could not be created by divided on Full Scale IQ, since that would introduce spurious 
negative correlations among subtests (since those subtests contribute to the calculation of FSIQ). 
Instead, the groups were created based on the scores from a single subtest (Vocabulary), as well 
as a replication subtest (Information). In the lowest ability groups (IQ equivalent of less than 78), 
the average subtest intercorrelations were about .7, while in the highest ability groups (IQ 
equivalent of greater than 122), the intercorrelations were about .4.  
 Since this investigation, different researchers have taken various approaches to studying 
this phenomenon. Deary et al. (1996), for example, created similarly distributed subsamples of 
low and high IQ 14- to 17-year-olds from a sample of 10,500 school-age children, and found that 
the first principal component accounted for about 2% more variance in the high IQ groups. 
Abad, Colom, Juan-Espinosa, and Garcı́a (2003) used this same methodology on a sample of 
3,430 university applicants, as well as the Spanish standardization sample of the WAIS-III (n = 
823). In the university sample, a single common factor accounted for about 2% more variance in 
the low ability groups than in the high ability groups; in the WAIS-III sample, this difference 
was about 12%. The same methodology was also applied by Kane, Oakland, and Brand (2006), 
who created high and low IQ groups from the Woodcock-Johnson Psycho-Educational Battery—
Revised (WJ-R) standardization sample (n = 6,359, ages 2 to 95). A single common factor 
accounted for 52% of the variance in the test scores in the low IQ group, while the variance 
explained in the high IQ group was only 29%.  
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 In M. R. Reynolds and Keith (2007), the standardization sample of the Kaufman 
Assessment Battery for Children—Second Edition (KABC-II) was used (ages 6 to 18); high (n = 
594) and low (n = 593) ability groups were selected based on Anderson-Rubin factor scores 
obtained from principal factor analysis in order to minimize selection effects. Here, the 
researchers used confirmatory factor analysis to fit two hierarchical ability models; one model 
was a higher-order model, in which g is at the apex and imposes a structure on the covariances of 
the first-order factors. This model is consistent with CHC three-stratum theory, and allows for 
the higher-order g factor to influence subtest performance indirectly via the broad abilities. They 
also fit a bifactor model, in which there are fewer mathematical constraints and the g factor 
influences subtest performance directly. An illustration of these models (which comes from M. 
R. Reynolds & Keith, 2007) is found in Figure 1. It is worth noting that the Gf factor in the 
bifactor model is underidentified as it only has two indicators; M. R. Reynolds and Keith (2007) 
did not include a Gf factor in their bifactor model for the actual analyses. 
 
 
Figure 1. Two hierarchical conceptions of intelligence: the higher-order model is on the left and the bifactor 
model is on the right. From M. R. Reynolds & Keith (2007). 
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In the higher order model investigation, g explained more variance, on average, in the 
subtests for the low ability group (.16) compared to the higher ability group (.07), suggesting that 
“g is less important in explaining individual variation in performance on cognitive tests for 
higher ability children,” just as SLODR would predict. Interestingly, the average proportion of 
variance explained in the subtests by the broad abilities did not change across the low and high 
ability groups (.22 and .23, respectively). The average proportion of residual, or unexplained, 
variance was .62 for the low ability group and .70 for the high ability group. Taken together, this 
finding suggests that the smaller amount of variance explained by g in higher ability individuals 
is not explained adequately by the broad abilities, but by a greater proportion of unique variance 
than lower ability individuals. In other words, SLODR acts on g and not on the broad abilities 
(even though, as is pointed out, the contribution of g to various broad abilities is lower in the 
high ability group). These findings were nearly identical in the bifactor model, suggesting that 
SLODR operates similarly for either hierarchical model.  
 M. R. Reynolds and Keith (2007) also tested SLODR with the higher-order model by 
using the model with all first-order intercepts invariant (except for Gc, as it was determined that 
the low and high ability groups differ in Gc beyond their difference in g), testing whether the 
variances in g differed across ability groups. This model fit significantly worse than the specific 
factor means model, and the high ability groups showed significantly lower variability in g than 
the low ability group. This difference in variances suggests that g is “more homogenous in the 
high ability group,” as SLODR would predict. When M. R. Reynolds and Keith (2007) analyzed 
the bifactor model, similar findings occurred. Broad ability factor variances were set to be 
invariant across groups, but the model did not fit significantly worse than the previous scalar 
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invariant model (in which equality constraints were added to the subtest intercepts). When the g 
variances were constrained to be equal, however, the model fit was significantly worse. This 
finding, too, suggests that SLODR operates at the level of g, but not at the level of the broad 
abilities. Furthermore, SLODR was not produced primarily by subtests with low g loadings in 
either the higher-order or the bifactor model, meaning that SLODR is not a function of the 
magnitude of g loadings.  
 M. R. Reynolds and Keith’s (2007) finding that SLODR operates on g and not on the 
broad abilities seems to be inconsistent with the findings in Carlstedt (2001), who found that, at 
higher ability levels, the contribution of Gc and Gv increased. Keith and Reynolds (2007) posited 
that these inconsistencies may be due to differing age ranges used in each study, the different 
number of groups used (Carlstedt, 2001, used more than two groups), or because Keith and 
Reynolds used multiple broad abilities as first-order factors.  
The finding that g explains less variance in the broad abilities across both the high and 
low ability groups was also noted in, for example, Kane and Brand (2006), who found lower 
broad ability loadings on g in the high ability group. Keith and Reynolds (2007) noted that this 
sort of finding fits nicely into Anderson’s (1992) theory of minimal cognitive architecture, in 
which a general processing mechanism is not allowing for differentiation in low ability groups 
because it is working harder on all cognitive tasks. Interestingly, M. R. Reynolds and Keith 
(2007) found a rather large decrease in Gf variance explained by g in the high ability group, a 
finding which seems to be in opposition to many researchers (e.g., Gustafsson, 1984) who have 
noted that Gf and g are often indistinguishable from one another. M. R. Reynolds and Keith 
(2007) explained this finding by stating that the KABC-II may in fact not represent Gf as 
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strongly as other measures might have, a finding echoed by M. R. Reynolds, Keith, Fine, Fisher, 
and Low (2007).  
Der and Deary (2003) were the first study to use nonlinear models to examine SLODR; 
polynomial regressions were used to predict scores on a test of verbal and numeric reasoning 
(Part I of the Alice Heim 4 [AH4]) from simple and complex reaction time tasks. The researchers 
posited that SLODR was perhaps better understood nonlinearly; that is, the relationship between 
ability level and g saturation is not a linear function and that the slope would be steeper at lower 
ability levels. Indeed, their findings confirmed that a quadratic model better described the 
relation between the reasoning measure and the simple reaction time task in the direction 
predicted by SLODR.  
Further complicating the study of SLODR is the finding that the phenomenon may not 
operate invariantly across the age span. In Facon (2006), the French standardization sample of 
the WISC-III was split into three age groups (total sample included ages 7 to 15), and then each 
age group was split into high and low ability groups. By comparing the median intercorrelation 
between subtests for each subgroup, he found that the greatest difference between high and low 
ability groups was in the oldest group pairing. Facon (2004) compared high and low ability 
groups in children aged 4 to 9 and found that the intercorrelations were not significantly different 
from one another. He therefore concluded that SLODR must not manifest until later in the age 
span, and that age may be an important variable in the study of the phenomenon. Another study 
concluded the same thing using longitudinal sampling of British twins at ages 7, 9, and 10; the 
first principal component explains more variance in g in the low ability group at every age and in 
both sexes separately, but, except for 7-year-old females, these differences between the low and 
high ability groups were not significant (Arden & Plomin, 2007).  
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As is noted in Deary et al. (1996) and, more recently, in Tucker-Drob (2009), the use of 
arbitrary criteria (i.e., test score cutoffs) is potentially problematic. SLODR may not be a linear 
hypothesis at all, as was noted by Der and Deary (2003). Additionally, arbitrarily dividing a 
continuous variable may incur possible artifacts of that division (e.g., unequal ranges of scores). 
Tucker-Drob (2009) attempted to simultaneously address the issues of nonlinearity and age 
differentiation in a series of models; while he consistently found support for ability 
differentiation (i.e., SLODR), he was less able to find meaningful evidence of age modification 
of ability differentiation. Most notably, his model of ability differentiation was nonlinear and 
covered nearly the entirety of the lifespan (n = 6,273, ages 4 to 101). A similar approach to the 
problem will be used in the present study. Given the lack of support for age-related variables in 
Tucker-Drob’s (2009) study, the present study will not attempt to include age variables or 
modifiers.  
 
Race differences and g 
 Evidence suggests that most well-developed, modern intelligence tests lack cultural bias 
on the basis of race (Valencia & Suzuki, 2001). On well-known measures such as the Woodcock 
Johnson Cognitive battery and the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children—Fifth Edition, there 
is evidence to support equivalent factor structures across racial groups (Edwards & Oakland, 
2006; Scheiber, 2016).  
 For the Differential Ability Scales, Second Edition (DAS-II), Trundt (2013) conducted a 
study in which a multi-group confirmatory factor analysis was used to test for measurement 
invariance across Asian, Black, Hispanic and White children and adolescents using the 
standardization sample. This methodology tested whether criteria for increasingly strict levels of 
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invariance were met across groups. For the Asian and Hispanic subsamples (as compared to the 
White subsample), all three levels of invariance were supported, indicating that the underlying 
constructs measured by the DAS-II are similar between these groups. However, there were 
inconsistent findings between the Black and White subsamples. Comparisons were made 
between the groups twice, once with an initial comparison group (White 1) and again with a 
replication sample (White 2). When the Black subsample was compared to the White 1 
subsample, configural and metric invariance was supported, meaning that the configuration of 
subtests and factors is consistent across groups. Full intercept invariance was not supported, 
though, and partial intercept invariance models were explored. By allowing the intercept of the 
Digits Forward subtest to vary across groups, model fit was significantly improved, indicating 
that the Digits Forward subtest on the DAS-II may be differentially more difficult for one group 
(White 1) than the other group (Black). This subtest does not contribute to the calculation of the 
overall general cognitive ability score; it contributes only to the diagnostic cluster for working 
memory. Furthermore, this finding of partial intercept invariance was not supported in the 
replication sample; in fact, the change in model fit at the intercept invariance level for the initial 
comparison group (White 1) was just barely significant (.011 value at a .01 cutoff).  
 The Trundt (2013) study concluded by stating that the subtests from the DAS-II do not 
appear to show any evidence of construct bias across any of the groups included in the study. 
The present study will use the same sample as this analysis.  
Sex differences and g 
Intelligence tests are carefully constructed so that there will be no average overall 
difference between sexes (Brody, 1992). Most researchers have found that on these tests, there 
are no sex differences (Camarata & Woodcock, 2006; Colom, Juan-Espinosa, Abad, & Garcı́a, 
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2000; Deary, Strand, Smith, & Fernandes, 2007; Deary, Thorpe, Wilson, Starr, & Whalley, 2003; 
Jensen, 1998; Mackintosh, 1996; Spinath, Spinath, & Plomin, 2008; van der Sluis et al., 2006), 
though some researchers have found either a small advantage for males (Deary, Irwing, Der, & 
Bates, 2007; Jackson & Rushton, 2006; Lynn, Raine, Venables, Mednick, & Irwing, 2005; 
Nyborg, 2005) or small advantage for females (Harnqvist, 1997; Rosén, 1995). One review 
found that these differences can be explained by non-representative samples, as well as greater 
male variance in general cognitive ability (Dykiert, Gale, & Deary, 2009), a finding that was 
confirmed by Hunt and Madhyastha (2008).  
Although there is great debate about the nature and extent of sex differences in various 
cognitive abilities, the reality is that these differences may just depend on the test or 
measurement used (Halpern, Beninger, & Straight, 2011; Halpern & LaMay, 2000). One 
commonly replicated finding is that females tend to perform better on tests of verbal abilities, 
especially those that include long-term memory (Hedges & Nowell, 1995; Johnson & Bouchard, 
2007) and processing speed components (Camarata & Woodcock, 2006; Hedges & Nowell, 
1995; Keith, Reynolds, Patel, & Ridley, 2008; van der Sluis et al., 2006). Males, however, tend 
to perform better on tasks related to visuospatial working memory and fluid reasoning, especially 
as they relate to scientific and mathematical domains (Hedges & Nowell, 1995; Torres et al., 
2006; Voyer et al., 1995). In Jensen (1998), tests that “load heavily on g,” but that were not 
normed to eliminate sex differences, were analyzed. Jensen found no mean g differences, noting 
that males tended to do better in some areas, while females did better in other areas.  
Keith, Reynolds, Roberts, Winter, and Austin (2011) analyzed the DAS-II 
standardization sample (ages 5 to 17) in order to test for sex differences in overall g and in the 
broad ability factors; this study used multi-group mean and covariance structural equation 
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modeling in order to test these questions across age. Although no significant differences existed 
on the g factor or on the Gc factor, a few small advantages were discovered within the broad 
abilities. Girls performed better on tasks related to processing speed (Gs) and on free-recall 
memory, a narrow ability of long-term retrieval (Glr). Younger girls performed better on short-
term memory (Gsm) tasks. Boys, as predicted, showed an advantage in visual-spatial ability 
tasks.  
Another notable sex difference is that males tend to be overrepresented in the tails of the 
g distribution. That is, there are more males than females in the highest percentiles of g and in 
the lowest (DeFries & Gillis, 1993; Halpern, 2012). Males are more likely to be diagnosed with 
learning disabilities, intellectual disabilities, and language disorders (Halpern, 2012; Henning-
Stout & Close-Conoley, 1992). One literature review placed the ratio of males to females at 3.6 
to 1 across several categories of intellectual disability (Volkman, Szatmari, & Sparrow, 1993). 
This phenomenon may contribute to findings that support higher male intelligence; because test 
samples collected in school settings are not typically given to those with intellectual disabilities, 
the greater number of males at the lower end of the spectrum are often omitted (Halpern et al., 
2011). This phenomenon may also help explain why, in Keith et al. (2011), boys showed larger 
variances for several broad abilities on the DAS-II; these differences, however, were not 
statistically significant. 
While Spearman’s Law of Diminishing Returns has been studied extensively, and 
invariance of measurement across racial/ethnic and sex groups has been studied extensively, no 
one has yet studied invariance of SLODR across racial/ethnic and sex groups. 
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Proposed Research Study 
Statement of Problem/Purpose 
 Despite strong research support for Spearman’s Law of Diminishing Returns (SLODR), 
no research study has attempted to determine whether SLODR operates differentially by 
race/ethnicity or by sex. This topic was illuminated in M. R. Reynolds (2013), in which the 
author noted that a study limitation was that “it is unknown whether or how SLODR operates 
differently in different subgroups, for example, related to sex or ethnicity.” Even though most 
previous research inquiries have used representative samples, the question of subgroup 
differentiation is empirically unique.  
 As with any topic related to the field of intelligence, the stakes are high: intelligence 
testing is perhaps the most important aspect in determinations of special education eligibility and 
gifted program placement (Holdnack & Weiss, 2006; Kaufman & Harrison, 1986). It is therefore 
crucial that the nature of intelligence is well-understood, as theoretical models influence the 
construction and interpretation of those measures. The more well-understood SLODR becomes, 
the more accurately practitioners can interpret test findings; for example, the importance of broad 
ability scores may be more important when making decisions about giftedness curricula than 
they would be during decisions about placement into special education programs. 
Furthermore, the study of SLODR has often relied on linear methodologies to establish 
(or disprove) its existence; by using a nonlinear modeling approach to this question, a more 
descriptive and better-fitting model can be used to understand the nature of SLODR in each of 
the subgroups studied.  
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Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The research questions are:  
1. Does Spearman’s Law of Diminishing Returns (SLODR) operate differentially by 
race/ethnicity?  
2. Does Spearman’s Law of Diminishing Returns (SLODR) operate differentially by sex? 
 
Considering the general lack of research on this topic, it is difficult to anticipate 
hypotheses based on prior studies. For Research Question 1 (RQ1), my hypothesis is the null; 
that is, that SLODR will not operate differentially by race/ethnicity. The DAS-II has 
demonstrated invariant factor structures across race/ethnicity subgroups (Trundt et al., 2017); in 
fact, most modern intelligence tests show a lack of cultural bias on the basis of race (Valencia & 
Suzuki, 2001). There is no reason, therefore, to anticipate a drastic departure from this finding in 
the present study.  
For Research Question 2 (RQ2), my hypothesis is also the null; that is, that SLODR will 
not operate differentially by sex. This hypothesis is more difficult to predict, as males tend to be 
overrepresented in the tails of the g distribution (DeFries & Gillis, 1993; Halpern, 2012). This 
phenomenon could perhaps make it so that the “steeper slopes” found in the lower end of ability 
in the Der and Deary (2003) study are steeper for males. In the Facon (2004) study, male and 
female children demonstrated no significant differences in the amount of variance explained by g 
in the first principal component; however, in that same study, SLODR was not supported, as the 
ages of the participants were (presumably) too low. Because there have not been any clear 
research inquiries about sex differences and SLODR, the null hypothesis of no differences in 
SLODR across sexes seems plausible.  
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Method 
Instrumentation 
 The Differential Ability Scales, Second Edition (DAS-II, Elliott, 2007) is a measure of 
cognitive abilities. The test is administered individually and is standardized for children and 
adolescents between the ages 2:6 and 17:11. The current study will focus on children between 
the ages of 7:1 and 17:11. The DAS-II is a popular measure for assessing children and 
adolescents because of its ease of use, as well as its non-verbal composite score availability 
(Dumont, Willis, & Elliott, 2008).  
 The DAS-II includes two separate batteries: the Early Years Battery for ages 2:6 to 6:11, 
and the School-Age Battery for ages 7:0 to 17:11. The Early Years Battery is further divided into 
Lower Level (2:6 to 3:5) and Upper Level (3:6 to 6:11) batteries. The present study will focus on 
children and adolescents that participated in the standardization of the School-Age Battery (ages 
7:0 to 17:11).  
 The DAS-II yields an overall composite score called General Conceptual Ability, or 
GCA. This overall composite score summed from three cluster scores: Verbal Ability, Nonverbal 
Reasoning Ability, and Spatial Ability. Two additional cluster scores are provided (Working 
Memory and Processing Speed); however, these are not included in the calculation of the GCA. 
The DAS-II also includes five diagnostic subtests that do not contribute to the calculation of any 
cluster score. One of these diagnostic subtests (Phonological Processing) is only given to 
children up to age 12:11, and is thus not included in the present study. For the purposes of this 
study, the cluster scores will not be used; rather, the individual subtests will be used to estimate 
factors corresponding to CHC broad abilities. Overall, the DAS-II School-Age Battery includes 
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fourteen unique subtests that are given to all children between the ages of 7:0 and 17:11. A 
description of each of these subtests is provided in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Description of the DAS-II Subtests Included in the School-Age Battery (Ages 7:0 to 17:11) 
Subtest Broad CHC Ability Description 
Word Definitions Gc Child tells the meaning of words 
Verbal Similarities Gc Childs indicates how three named things are similar 
   
Matrices Gf Child selects a figure that completes a 2x2 or 3x3 matrix 
Sequential and Quantitative 
Reasoning 
Gf Child determines which object completes a series of 
objects or numbers 
Pattern Construction Gv Child replicates designs created by the examiner or 
pictured using wooden blocks, plastic blocks, or flat 
squares 
Recall of Designs Gv Child re-creates a drawing after viewing it for 5 seconds 
Recognition of Pictures Gv Child is shown a picture of one or more objects for 5 
seconds and then selects the previously viewed object(s) 
from a second pictorial array that includes distracters 
Recall of Objects– Immediate Glr Examiner teaches the names of 20 objects; the child 
recalls as many objects as possible in 40–45 seconds 
immediately after card is removed 
Recall of Objects– Delayed Glr Child recalls as many objects as possible 10–30 min after 
initial exposure, in 45 seconds, without viewing them 
again 
Recall–Digits Forward Gsm Child repeats spoken digits 
Recall–Digits Backwards Gsm Child repeats spoken digits in reverse order 
Recall of Sequential Order Gsm Child recites body parts and other objects in sequential 
order stated by the examiner 
Speed of Information 
Processing 
Gs Child quickly determines the circle that contains the 
greatest number of squares or the highest number in each 
row 
Rapid Naming Gs Child indicates the color, object, or the color and object of 
pictures presented by the examiner 
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 Information provided in the DAS-II manual indicates adequate to strong evidence of 
reliability (Elliott, 2007). In the overall standardization sample, test-retest reliability coefficients 
for all scores (subtest, cluster, and GCA) ranged from .63 to .91. Average internal consistencies 
for each cluster ranged from .87 to .96, indicating excellent internal reliability. Average internal 
consistencies for individual subtests range from .77 to .95, also indicating adequate to excellent 
internal reliability. External research further indicates that the DAS-II standardization data has 
internal structure validity, meaning that it appears to measure the constructs it intended  (Canivez 
& McGill, 2016; Keith, Low, Reynolds, Patel, & Ridley, 2010; Keith et al., 2011). Trundt, Keith, 
Caemmerer, and Smith (2017) found a lack of construct bias among African-American, Asian, 
Hispanic, and Caucasian children within the standardization sample.  
Participants 
 Participants will be selected from the DAS-II standardization sample, which is stratified 
according to age, sex, race/ethnicity, parent education level, and geographic region based on the 
2005 U.S. Census. Table 3 provides demographic characteristics of the overall standardization 
sample (age 4:0 to 17:11). The sample for this study, however, will only include all children and 
adolescents in the overall standardization sample between the ages of 7:0 and 17:11. The sample 
will be age-limited as these children were administered a common battery of tests.  
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Table 3 
Demographic Characteristics of the DAS-II Standardization Sample, Age 4 to 17 
Variable N 
Total Sample 2,952 
Sex   
   Male 1,476 
   Female 1,476 
Race/Ethnicity   
   White 1,852 
   Hispanic 496 
   Black 458 
   Asian 115 
   Other 29 
Parent Education (Average Years of 
Schooling) 
  
   ≤8 126 
   9 to 11 272 
   12 (High school degree or 
equivalent) 
796 
   13 to 15 (Some college or 2-year 
degree) 
959 
   ≥16 (college or graduate degree) 799 
  
Because the selected sample will include a much larger number of Caucasian 
participants, a random sample of Caucasian participants will be selected that is equivalent in size 
to the next largest subsample. For the sex differences research question, all males and females 
will be compared. 
  
  24 
Analyses and Expected Results 
 Using the standardization data from the DAS-II, separate multigroup higher-order models 
(by race/ethnicity and by sex) will be created. A higher-order model approach was chosen 
because it will allow for the use of only two indicators on multiple broad abilities (J. C. 
Anderson & Gerbing, 1988).  
 In M. R. Reynolds, Hajovsky, Niileksela, and Keith (2011), a higher-order model was 
created to test for SLODR in the DAS-II standardization sample. Two models were created in 
this study, one for ages 5 to 8 and another for ages 9 to 17. The latter model includes the same 
subtests that will be included in the current study. Figure 3 shows the within-class confirmatory 
factor analysis model from this study. Model fit for this model was very good: χ² = 423.97, 
RMSEA = .053, CFI = .967, SRMR = .037.  
 
Figure 2. Within-class confirmatory factor analysis model for ages 9-17 on the DAS-II from M. R. Reynolds, 
Hajovsky, Niileksela, and Keith (2011). 
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 With the current DAS-II School-Age sample, a Ga factor would be not be indicated by 
any subtest and will therefore not be included in this analysis. The Gv factor and the Gsm factor 
are indicated by three subtests, while the rest of the broad abilities are indicated by two. Keith et 
al. (2010) also noted in their study of the DAS-II factor structure that the Glr factor’s indexing 
subtests (Recall of Objects, Immediate and Delayed) may reflect “a less broad ability than long-
term retrieval,” but for the purposes of this study, the Glr factor will be retained as is.  
The higher-order model will be separately applied to groups divided by race and by 
gender for each of the six broad abilities included in the DAS-II validation model. As mentioned 
previously, I will select a Caucasian subsample at random to compare each of the race/ethnicity 
subsamples (African-American, Asian, and Hispanic). Likewise, the model will be applied 
separately to each of the two sex-divided subsamples.  
The analyses will be conducted using Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 2017) and will follow a 
procedure based in part on the method used by Tucker-Drob (2009). The first step will be to 
establish configural invariance across both the male and female groups and each of the groups 
divided on race/ethnicity. This test involves setting the factors and pattern of loadings to be the 
same for all groups; in other words, the model structure will be the same across groups, but the 
parameters to be estimated (means, intercepts, variances, etc.) will be free to vary. Means of 
latent variables will be fixed to zero, and the intercepts for the measured variables will be freely 
estimated for all groups. Configural invariance should be able to be established for the groups 
divided by race/ethnicity as it was also established by Trundt (2013) on the DAS-II overall 
standardization sample. Configural invariance should also be able to be established in the male 
and female groups, as Keith et al. (2011) demonstrated in the DAS-II standardization sample.  
  26 
Support for configural invariance (and other forms of invariance) is assessed by 
comparing various indicators of model fit, such as the Likelihood Ratio Test, or the difference in 
chi-square between two models (Δχ²; Cheung & Rensvold, 2002); the χ² statistic is highly 
sensitive to sample size (Brannick, 1995), and therefore may not be practically useful for 
comparing competing models. Cheung and Rensvold (2002) suggested using comparative fit 
index difference (ΔCFI) across competing models. CFI is not affected by sample size or model 
complexity. The critical value for ΔCFI is -0.01, so a decrease in CFI greater than 0.01 across 
models suggests a lack of invariance across groups at that level.  
The next step will be to establish metric invariance across both the male and female 
groups and each of the groups divided on race/ethnicity (assuming configural invariance is 
supported). This is accomplished by running a model where the factor loadings are constrained 
to be equal across groups, but the intercepts are still allowed to differ between groups. This 
procedure tests whether the relation of the subtests (measured variables) to the broad ability 
scores (latent variables), or the scale of the latent variables, is the same across groups. As with 
configural invariance, metric invariance should be able to be established for the groups divided 
by race/ethnicity in the current study as it was also established by Trundt (2013) on the DAS-II 
overall standardization sample. Metric invariance should also be able to be established in the 
male and female groups, as Keith et al. (2011) demonstrated in the DAS-II standardization 
sample. This too will be assessed using ΔCFI. 
Intercept invariance will then be tested by constraining first-order factor intercepts to zero 
for one group only (e.g., female and White: one for each comparison). The second-order means 
will be constrained to zero for both groups. Any differences in means on the measured variables 
will therefore be due to differences in latent means. If intercept invariance is supported, then 
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differences in latent means should account for any differences across the groups in subtest 
scores. 
Residual invariance will then be assessed by keeping the model from the intercept 
invariance model and then setting subtest residual variances (and covariances, if any) equal 
across groups. If residual invariance is accomplished, that would mean that any differences in 
subtest scores are the result of the latent variables.  
As the model in question is higher-order, structural invariance should be established 
between groups. In order to do this, a further series of steps must be taken. Firstly, the residual 
invariance model will be used (all future invariance steps are additive), and then second-order 
loadings will be set equal across groups. The second-order means will be set to zero for all 
groups. Invariance at this step would mean that the second-order factor (in other words, g) has 
the same meaning across groups. 
Next, first-order intercepts will be set to zero for both groups. The second-order mean 
would be set to zero for only one group. Invariance at this step would mean that there is no mean 
differences across groups on the first-order latent variable (g). First-order unique variances will 
then be set equal across groups. Invariance at this step would mean that the unique aspects of the 
first-order factors (not explained by second-order factors) are the same across groups. Second-
order variances will then be set equal groups; invariance here would mean that the second-order 
factors are equally variable across groups. Lastly, second-order factor means will be set equal 
across groups. Invariance at this step would mean that the means are equal across groups on the 
second-order factor. If, through all of these steps, invariance is continually supported, structural 
invariance of the second-order loading would be established. It is reasonable to assume that 
metric and structural invariance will be supported for all between-group comparisons (sex and 
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race/ethnicity), as Trundt (2013) and Keith et al. (2011) found no evidence of construct bias by 
race or sex, respectively.  
Assuming invariance has been supported, an interaction component (gxg) will then be 
created in Mplus using a g XWITH g command (Maslowsky, Jager, & Hemken, 2015). More 
specifically, the “XWITH” procedure in Mplus tests the interaction between two latent variables; 
in this case, the variables are just the higher-order g factor with itself (in other words, g²). Then, 
the gxg term will be regressed on each broad ability (i.e., “Gc ON gxg”).  
 When the “XWITH” command is used in Mplus, standard model fit indices such as CFI, 
RMSEA, or χ², are not computed. Instead, a two-step method must be used to assess overall fit 
for each interaction model (Klein & Moosbrugger, 2000). First, fit statistics such as CFI, 
RMSEA, or χ² are obtained from the model without the interaction (or Model 0). Then, the 
relative fit of Model 0, which here is the null model, is compared to Model 1 (the one with the 
interaction) using a log-likelihood ratio test. This test is used to determine whether Model 0, 
which is more parsimonious, represents a significant loss in fit compared to a more complex 
Model 1 (Satorra & Bentler, 2010). If Model 0 represents a significant loss in fit compared to 
Model 1, then it can be concluded that Model 1 is also a well-fitted model. The test-statistic for a 
log-likelihood ratio test (or D) is calculated as follows (Maslowsky et al., 2015):  
D = -2[(log-likelihood for Model 0) – (log-likelihood for Model 1)] 
Values of D are approximately distributed as χ². Maslowsky et al. (2015) gives a fuller 
explanation of the procedure of comparing Models 0 and 1 using such a test. 
Assuming Model 1, or the interaction model, is a well-fitted model for each of the 
groups, then it will be used to make comparisons across males and females and across each of 
the groups divided on race/ethnicity. This is a valid assumption, as Tucker-Drob’s (2009) g² 
  29 
model showed a significant improvement in fit from a linear model, thus supporting the ability 
differentiation hypothesis (i.e., SLODR).  
 The same model fit comparison issues will be present during the group comparison stage, 
though the two-step model proposed by Klein and Moosbrugger (2000) will not be possible 
because both models will include interaction terms. In order to compare models using a log-
likelihood ratio test, Model 0 must lack an XWITH term. Therefore, a more qualitative approach 
to assessing invariance must be used for between-group comparisons by sex and by race. This 
can be accomplished by plotting the model results for each group. The model-implied relations 
between the score on the g factor and each broad ability can be plotted, similar to the way in 
which Tucker-Drob (2009) plotted his model output (see Figure 3). In this illustration, multiple 
broad abilities are plotted at once; however, plotting multiple broad abilities for multiple groups 
would be overly complicated to qualitatively assess. This issue can be alleviated by plotting one 
broad ability at a time with each group’s g-broad ability relation being compared across males 
and females and across each race/ethnicity group. 
 
Figure 3. Model-implied relations between the score on the g factor and each broad ability for the adult sample. From 
Tucker-Drob (2009). 
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 A formal way to measure invariance between two models with a latent interaction term 
does not yet exist other than to qualitatively measure differences using an illustration. 
Nevertheless, these illustrations can be illuminating if, as hypothesized, the plots of each g-broad 
ability relation do not appear to differ across groups. If there is indeed clear visual evidence of a 
difference across groups, a further examination of this invariance can be conducted. 
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Discussion 
Summary 
 The purpose of this study is to determine whether Spearman’s Law of Diminishing 
Returns operates differentially by race/ethnicity or by sex. As was discussed in the Integrative 
Analysis section, the extant research on SLODR supports the existence of the phenomenon. 
Various methods have been used over time to measure SLODR, including a comparison of 
intercorrelations, principal component analysis, and, more recently, confirmatory factor analysis 
and nonlinear modeling. Likewise, invariance of measurement between racial/ethnic groups and 
sex groups has been demonstrated repeatedly. Never before, though, has anyone measured the 
invariance of SLODR across racial/ethnic and sex groups.  
 In the present analysis, separate multigroup higher-order models (by race/ethnicity and by 
sex) will be created in which linear and nonlinear (squared) loadings will be estimated. 
Limitations 
 The present study is limited firstly by its use of a single test measure, thereby 
constraining the analysis to the subtests used in the DAS-II School Age Battery. Though the 
psychometric properties of the DAS-II are sound, and the test is aligned with CHC theory, many 
of the broad abilities are indicated only by two subtests.  
 Another limitation is that no Ga factor was included; however, it is reasonable to expect 
that Ga would operate in a similar way as the other broad abilities (that is, g would explain less 
variance in Ga in high-ability groups).  
 Though the racial/ethnic subsample sizes are comparatively quite large (when looking at 
other intelligence-based research), the fact that the White subsample is much large than the other 
groups is an issue. This is partially alleviated in the study by randomly selecting out a White 
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subsample to match the size of the next-largest subsample, but the disparate subsample sizes may 
make comparisons based on chi-square model fit indices problematic; chi-square is affected by 
sample size.  
 As was elaborated on in some depth in the Analysis section, the lack of model fit indices 
with an XWITH command make answering the research questions difficult using traditional 
methods. Though qualitative methods of assessing comparative model fit are not ideal, they can 
still be enlightening as a guide for future research. Nevertheless, a more traditional approach to 
this research question (which has not yet been studied using any methodology) may be more 
appealing to those who seek to find specific criteria for invariance.  
Future Directions and Implications 
 Determining whether SLODR operates similarly across race/ethnicity and sex is a 
necessary step before continuing to do research about the phenomenon. If the null hypothesis 
turns out to be disproved, replications of the study using different test measures, samples, and 
methodologies must be completed. Indeed, this is a good next step regardless of the outcome of 
the present study. Given the importance of measurement invariance across these groups, 
replications are encouraged. If the null hypothesis is repeatedly supported, then research on 
SLODR can be conducted with the knowledge that the phenomenon is stable across 
race/ethnicity and sex groups.  
 As far as SLODR is concerned, there remain a number of questions about the nature of 
the phenomenon. As was suggested in the M.R. Reynolds and Keith (2007) article, the variance 
not explained by g in higher-ability individuals is not explained by the broad abilities, either. In 
that study, subtest-level unique and error variances were different across ability groups, but the 
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precise nature of these differences is unknown. Assessing whether there is more unique variance 
or more error variance for higher-ability individuals could shed light on the nature of SLODR. 
 An understanding of SLODR can be important in schools, where the use of intelligence 
testing is often the central determinant for both special education services and placement into a 
gifted program. If overall intelligence is indeed a less adequate reflection of a higher-ability 
student’s cognitive capabilities, then perhaps those making determinations about gifted programs 
should look more closely at broad ability (or cluster) scores to make more informed decisions 
about a student’s particular strengths.  
 Considering intelligence is a highly predictive latent variable, capable of even predicting 
future job performance (Schmidt & Hunter, 2004), SLODR might predict that, for higher-ability 
individuals, g would be less predictive than domain-specific broad ability scores.  
 While it may be simpler to use previous methods of assessing SLODR for this sort of 
question (i.e., linear factor analytic modeling, or even principal component analysis), the future 
direction of SLODR research seems to be in nonlinear factor analytic modeling. Nevertheless, an 
examination of this question from a more traditional methodology may be warranted as a 
supplement to the present study.  
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